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Abstract 
While there is growing interest in political crises in political communication research, crisis has not yet 
become a meaningful concept.  Also, research tends to be reactive, which is suggested by an analysis of 
when and how the “crisis” label occurred in Swiss media from 2000 to 2018 and how recent scholarship 
examines political crises.  This commentary gives an overview of different research areas within this frag-
mented “crisis” field and discusses a nuanced concept of crises that is more sensitive to the causes and 
dynamics of communicatively constructed crises on the macro level.  It argues that a more systematic, 
more comparative and more macro-oriented research on political crises will help reduce the reactive nature 
of the field and enhance its public relevance.
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1 Introduction
Crisis quickly has become an issue in po-
litical communication research. Just let 
us look at three recent conferences in the 
field. First, the Political Communication 
Section of ECREA labeled its bi-annual 
conference (Zurich, November 2017) “Po-
litical Communication in Times of Crisis: 
New Challenges, Trends & Possibilities”. 
Second, at the annual conference of the 
ICA (Prague, May 2018), two panels of the 
Political Communication Division debat-
ed on the “crisis of democracy”: one focus-
ing on “Global Populism, Local Populism: 
Comparing Sub-National Dynamics of the 
Crisis of Democracy”, another on “Social 
Media Platforms: A Crisis of Democracy?” 
Third, the political communication groups 
of DGPuK, DVPW and SGKM devoted their 
annual conference to “Political Commu-
nication in and about Crises” (Fribourg, 
February 2018). This last conference is the 
basis for three papers published in this 
special issue and the basis for this com-
mentary.
What does this apparent interest in 
cri ses reflect and what could we learn 
from it? First, there is a tendency for polit-
ical communication scholars to use crisis 
as a buzzword, sometimes not even de-
fining how crises differ from non-crises. 
In this sense, some scholars seem to react 
mainly to current (Western) public debate 
where the “crisis of democracy” frame has 
become prevalent especially since the 
conflict between Ukraine and Russia, the 
sudden increase of migrants in Europe in 
the summer of 2015, the Brexit vote 2016 
and the election of Donald J. Trump as 
the president of the United States in 2016. 
Second, political communication schol-
ars also understand very different things 
when allegedly talking about the same 
thing (crisis), which reflects a fragmented 
field. For instance, scholars apply crisis 
either to society and public communica-
tion at the macro level, borrowing theories 
from sociology and political science, or to 
concrete organizations on the meso level, 
relying more on public relations research. 
In this essay, I will argue that crisis has 
not yet become a meaningful concept in 
the field yet but there is potential to inte-
grate a fragmented field with a nuanced 
concept of crises that is more sensitive to 
the causes and dynamics of communica-
tively constructed crises on the macro lev-
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el. If we do this, I believe this would also 
allow us as a field to contribute with our 
research even more to society because 
we would use it to address more directly 
society’s pressing concerns. This means 
we could contribute more to the seismo-
graphic function (discussing problems be-
fore they turn into a crisis), more to a deep 
understanding of past crises (keeping the 
focus on explaining crises even if they 
have fallen out of the media’s spotlight) 
and more to a sober assessment of current 
crises (avoiding episodic, ad-hoc research 
as a mere reaction to public debates). This 
essay is meant to stimulate further debate 
within the field, which is why I will use a 
more commentary-oriented style and will 
take the liberty of making some general, 
simplified judgements.
This essay is structured into four parts. 
First, I analyze when and in which contexts 
the “crisis” label has been used in news 
coverage of Swiss media since 2000 and try 
to relate it to current research interests of 
scholars examining crises. Second, I give 
an overview what this broad and frag-
mented “crisis” research field looks like 
and what the implications are for political 
communication research. Third, I sketch 
out an approach that offers more linkag-
es within the fragmented field. I conclude 
with general remarks on the need for dia-
chronic, comparative analyses and more 
public engagement.
2 Mediated crises and research 
interests
As I argued, the current scholarly interest 
in political crises might be driven also in 
part from the current public debate. While 
I cannot prove this point with exact meth-
ods, especially not in an international 
context, I try to find plausible linkages be-
tween media coverage and scholars’ cur-
rent interest by looking at the debate about 
crises in Swiss media in a slightly longer 
time period. Especially when we focus on 
the more European or global crises, leav-
ing aside Switzerland’s domestic crises, we 
can use Swiss media coverage as a possi-
ble (albeit not perfect) yardstick for me-
dia attention to crises in general (at least 
in Western Europe and more specifically 
in Germany). This is because (Western) 
media across countries have developed 
professional standards and specific logics 
which events make the news. With the rise 
of international 24/7 TV channels, news 
agencies and generally more transnational 
news flows, big transnational events find it 
easier to be reported than before (Brügge-
mann & Wessler, 2014). In addition to that, 
in view of the “next-door-giant” effect, it 
is clear that German-speaking media in 
Switzerland show a significant overlap 
with news coverage in neighboring Ger-
many.
To track the salience of crises in Swiss 
media coverage, I was able to work with a 
pre-structured database of coded media 
articles at fög – Research Institute for the 
Public Sphere and Society at the University 
of Zurich. In the context of several research 
projects, full editions of newspapers were 
analyzed, with some restrictions, e. g. ex-
cluding very short articles, news agency 
reports, or ordinary sports coverage (game 
reports). Each article was assigned to an 
inductively generated “communication 
event” or issue (cf. Imhof 1993; Udris, 
Schneider & Lucht, 2015). In view of this 
inductive logic and the semantics that 
journalists themselves use when making 
sense of events, communication events 
can range from concrete episodes (e. g. 
earthquakes) and more mid-range events 
(e. g. elections including run-up and re-
flection afterwards) to more long-term, 
abstract processes (e. g. economic perfor-
mance in general) (Eisenegger, 2005). In 
this database, each communication event 
carries a distinct label capturing the geo-
graphical scope, the main actors involved 
and the thematic focus of newspaper cov-
erage.
From this collection, I chose three 
newspapers, each of which represents an 
important segment of the (German-speak-
ing) Swiss press system: Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung (NZZ) as a quality paper with 
an international outlook, Tages-Anzei-
ger as a quality-oriented “mid-market” 
paper addressing wider audiences than 
the NZZ, and finally Blick, Switzerland’s 
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largest tabloid daily. Within all coded is-
sues that these three newspapers cov-
ered over a time period from 2000 to 2017 
(n = 570 929), I used basic search strings to 
look at the intensity and type of debate of 
crises in general (regardless its context) 
and the crisis of democracy in particular. 
In addition, I analyzed in which commu-
nication events (issues) these articles ap-
pear. The following results are meant to 
show the broad picture and not the exact 
number of correct instances, which is why 
I did not check individual articles for false 
positives.
The results show that “crisis” as a term 
is often used but with noticeable peaks. In 
2009, the year with the highest frequency 
and highest share, these three newspapers 
mention “crisis” in around 18 news articles 
every single day, which constitutes 21% 
of the coded articles in 2009. In 2017, it is 
(only) around 10%. Just looking at the de-
velopment, it becomes clear that “crisis” is 
used more often from 2008 on, and the de-
crease from 2011 does not reach the pre-
2008 level any longer. As can be seen from 
the list of the largest five communication 
events per year (cf. Table 3 in the Appen-
dix), the main driver of this peak from 2008 
to 2012 is the “economic crisis” and the ac-
cording communication events clustered 
around it: the global financial crisis in 
2008, which also affects Switzerland’s larg-
est bank UBS, and later the “Euro crisis” 
or “Debt crisis”. Other drivers in that peak 
period include the accident at the nuclear 
power plant in Fukushima 2011 and the 
war in Syria in 2012. In 2014, “crisis” is most 
often used in connection with the conflict 
in the Ukraine. In 2015, another round of 
crisis in the Eurozone (e. g. the referendum 
in Greece) as well as a perception of a (Eu-
ropean) “refugee crisis” dominate. This 
“refugee crisis” also explains part of the 
re latively high attention to “crisis” in 2016, 
and the decreasing media interest to this 
issue in 2017 also correlates with decreas-
ing mentions of crisis overall. 
Taken together, these results indicate 
that crises discussed in Swiss media in 
the last two decades refer more often to 
economic than political crises and more 
often to violent conflicts and wars than 
non-violent political crises. One could ar-
gue that applying the term “crisis” to eco-
nomic crises (including crises of concrete 
companies such as Swissair or Fiat) than 
to political institutional crises is easier for 
Figure 1: Share of articles in Swiss media mentioning crises (2000–2017)
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Source: Pre-structured database of communication events at fög – Forschungsinstitut Öffentlichkeit und Gesellschaft
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the media as they can use seemingly sim-
ple and uncontested indicators such as 
falling stock market prices, state debts etc. 
Of course, economic crises had a clear po-
litical impact (e. g. regulation debate) and 
often were accompanied with political cri-
ses. Also, the results indicate that rapidly 
escalating violent conflicts such as in Syria 
(for Swiss media mainly in 2012), in Iraq 
(in 2003), between Israel and Lebanon (in 
2006) and between the Ukraine and Rus-
sia (in 2014) find high attention and are 
labeled as crisis events, especially since 
violence and the physically visible ero-
sion of the social order pose an imminent 
threat. The same can be said for riots like 
in France (2006). Finally, disasters such as 
the floods in Switzerland (2005), the tsuna-
mis in Thailand (late 2004) and Fukushima 
(2011) and epidemics such as the Bird 
Flu (2005–2006) and Ebola (2014) are in-
terpreted as “crisis” events and shape the 
media agenda. Given this overall pattern, 
the high attention to the “refugee crisis” in 
2015 and 2016 is remarkable, as this poli-
cy issue is neither a measurable econom-
ic crisis nor an obvious violent threat to 
the social order like a war (attack on one’s 
country) or a natural disaster which strikes 
suddenly. 
Regarding political crises on the sys-
tem level, I checked the use of “crisis” in 
context to the “crisis of democracy”, using 
a basic string with “crisis” that appeared in 
the same article as the word “democracy”. 
This is deliberately a very strict criterion, 
as crisis debates on the system level do 
not necessarily use the label “democracy”. 
Not surprisingly, the numbers mirroring 
this potentially much more self-reflexive 
debate are much lower (n = 4 376); overall, 
they constitute a mere 0.8% of all cod-
ed articles. In 2017, for instance, there is 
less than one article every day when cri-
sis appears in the context of democracy. 
But the development over time suggests 
an increasing awareness to political crises 
on the system level. Before, at the start of 
the century, the data shows much “noise”, 
meaning many isolated instances of crises 
that refer to one case (one country) and 
are thus geographically confined (e. g. the 
riots in Thailand in 2008). Not even the 
terrorist attacks on 9/11 (2001), in Madrid 
(2004) or London (2005) increase the per-
ception that there is a crisis of democracy 
of the Western world or a crisis of democ-
racy in general. The peak in 2009 reflects 
a whole series of isolated events (e. g. dif-
ficult coalition-building after the elections 
in Germany and protests in Iran).
It is only after 2009 that the articles 
really reflect a perception of more en-
compassing crises affecting democracies 
as such. For instance, in 2011 and 2012, 
events during and after the Arab Spring 
are set in relation to political crises, as are 
events following the crisis in the Eurozone. 
The more recent peaks (2016 and 2017) re-
flect the renewal of a political crisis in Eu-
rope in the context of the debt crisis and in 
the context of increasing Euroscepticism, 
which is found in the high attention to 
Brexit or to the success of right-wing pop-
ulists in Poland. Especially following the 
US presidential elections in 2016, there is 
much debate about the rise of populism, 
which again is used to highlight the al-
leged crisis of formerly stable political sys-
tems in established democracies (e. g. the 
seemingly surprising success of the right-
wing populist AfD in the German elections 
in 2017).
In sum, news coverage of Swiss me-
dia shows clear patterns when it comes to 
media attention to “big” global crises and 
different types of crises in general (eco-
nomic crises, war, conflict, disaster), some 
of which will look familiar also to scholars 
in other European countries given the reg-
ularities in international news flows. 
Against this background, what can 
we observe when looking at researchers’ 
current projects on political crises? To give 
an example, I examined how scholars at 
the conference on “Political Communica-
tion in and about Crises” (February 2018) 
used the crisis concepts in their abstracts 
and which crises they focused upon. The 
vast majority of scholars came from Ger-
man-speaking universities in Switzerland 
and Germany, which again makes the 
analysis of Swiss media coverage a rea-
sonable starting point. There were 15 ab-
stracts, each around one page long, which 
means potentially enough space to give at 
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least some information on the crisis con-
cept. 10 abstracts had a first author from 
a university in Germany. 5 abstracts had a 
first author from a Swiss university. 
13 out of those 15 abstracts did indeed 
use the word crisis, thus offering starting 
points for further debate among confer-
ence participants. (Two abstracts, focusing 
on terrorist attacks, did not even mention 
the word crisis.) Most abstracts focused 
on concrete crises that are and have been 
also salient in more recent Swiss media 
coverage (“refugee crisis”, Brexit, Ukraine, 
Euro “debt crisis”), while a few abstracts 
focused on more general, long-term pro-
cesses (climate change, terrorism, pop-
ulism). In this sense, scholarship seems 
to be responsive but unfortunately also 
reactive. To be clear, my critique is not a 
plea against conducting studies on recent 
salient crises such as the “refugee crisis” 
per se – after all, its extraordinary impact 
on the media agenda and public agenda 
is striking, which makes it a highly rele-
vant case. My plea is for a well-reasoned, 
justified selection of the crisis cases and 
the according links to theory. This justifi-
cation is not always given sufficiently; the 
reactive nature of our field was apparent at 
the conference because only two abstracts 
explained why the chosen, examined cri-
sis “is” actually a crisis (rather than just 
a conflict, a challenge, a routine process, 
etc.). Most abstracts just labeled some-
thing as a crisis without giving any reason. 
Typically, authors mentioned the “refugee 
crisis”, sometimes not even using inverted 
commas. In this sense, scholars willingly 
Figure 2: Articles in Swiss media mentioning the crisis of democracy (2000–2017)
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Table 1: Examined crises and scope  
of analysis
Examined crises N = (15)
Refugee crisis* 7
Climate change 2
Terrorist attacks (abstracts did not mention  
the word "crisis")
2
Ukraine crisis* 2
Brexit 1
Euro (debt) crisis* 1
(Right-wing) populism 1
Crises in general 1
Note. Examined crises and scope of analysis in 15 abstracts 
prepared for the conference “Political Communication in and about 
Crises” (2018); * one abstract examined and compared three crises 
(cf. Lichtenstein & Nitsch, 2019)
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or unwillingly accept the crisis labeling 
from public discourse. This is a problem 
because the term “crisis” is contested and 
crises are usually defined in public com-
munication, which also means crises are 
defined by political actors with a strategic 
interest in labeling events a “crisis” or by 
media following certain logics (be they po-
litical or commercial). Therefore, a stron-
ger awareness in our field regarding the la-
beling of political problems and conflicts 
would be helpful. Ideally, scholarship will 
address political crises without contribut-
ing to “hyped-up” crises and without ne-
glecting those formerly big crises that are 
now disappearing from the media agenda.
Regarding the reactive nature of the 
field, we could also wonder why political 
communication scholars do not (any lon-
ger) study former “big crises” such as the 
global financial “crisis” or the Euro “crisis”. 
Do we really know enough already wheth-
er and how political communication pat-
terns were at the root of these crises and 
how political communication as a whole 
relates to the still ongoing effects of the cri-
ses? For instance, what does it mean that 
new protest actors such as “Occupy Pa-
radeplatz” (who in 2011 protested against 
the financial sector on a square in Zurich 
where Switzerland’s two largest banks 
have their headquarters) appeared rather 
quickly with much media attention but 
rather quickly fell out of the media spot-
light? Are we as a field confident enough 
we can share our insights with the public 
and political actors to help prevent or al-
leviate a (likely) further economic “crisis”? 
And even more generally, are we doing 
enough to find basic patterns of different 
crises that would allow us to be more sen-
sitive to upcoming crises and thus allow us 
to be more of a seismograph of problems 
in a democratic society?
Some studies can be indeed consid-
ered less reactive and more continuous, as 
they focus on more long-term processes 
such as climate change (2 abstracts), ter-
rorism (series of terrorist attacks) (2 ab-
stracts) and populism (1 abstract). How-
ever, it is striking that the link to “crisis” in 
these abstracts was either fully absent or 
rather weak – with the study on populism 
as an exception. The studies on terrorism 
did not even mention the word “crisis” in 
the abstracts, and the abstracts on climate 
change just stipulated that climate change 
was one of the main crises of our time 
without giving any reasons why and how 
climate change really (now) is a political 
crisis. To put it bluntly, scholars focusing 
on concrete, delimited crises should clear-
ly justify their cases in order not do episod-
ic research, and scholars focusing on long-
term processes should clearly justify when 
exactly and under which circumstances 
these long-term processes change their 
dynamics and turn into political crises.
Reviewing the contributions at the 
conference in this light, the selection of 
three papers for this special issue is con-
vincing: First, the study by Kösters et al. 
(2019) chooses the most salient recent “cri-
sis”, i.e. the “refugee crisis”, but it does not 
take the crisis label at face value but rather 
asks how one shared topic which is salient 
in all segments of the population is inter-
preted differently in different political and 
communicative milieus. Thus, the study 
uses one indicator of “crisis” (high media 
attention) and links it to other indicators 
of “crisis” such as polarization (ideally two 
conflicting milieus) and sinking legitimacy 
of political elites in some milieus. In this 
sense, the results could also be used in 
the ongoing debate about “filter bubbles” 
and fragmentation. One strand of research 
suggests that selective exposure especially 
on digital media leads to filter bubbles in 
which different people and different mi-
lieus each have their own topic preferenc-
es. But this argument is difficult to sustain, 
especially when “extreme events” such 
as the “refugee crisis” are covered in the 
media, which reach most segments in the 
population (Pörksen, 2018). At least in my 
reading, the results of the study by Kösters 
et al. (2019) speak against the existence of 
filter bubbles, since these milieus all con-
sider the “refugee crisis” to be important. 
The results rather suggest the existence 
of what Pörksen (2018) would call a “filter 
clash”. Different milieus actually share and 
debate the same topic but in a networked 
and digital public sphere, they directly 
and immediately collide with each other 
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as their perceptions of the world (and of 
this topic) radically differ from each other. 
Second, the study of Nitsch and Lichten-
stein (2019) is one of the rare examples 
when several (types of) crises are analyzed 
and compared. Furthermore, the study is 
innovative as it applies established con-
cepts such as framing or indexing on satire 
shows, a news genre often overlooked and 
hardly ever linked to crisis research de-
spite its general relevance in people’s me-
dia consumption (also for news purposes) 
and despite the fact that satire often is es-
pecially important during crisis periods. 
Third, the study by Wirz et al. (2019) does 
justice to the active and strategic use of 
crisis rhetoric of political actors who dra-
matize developments and ultimately cre-
ate a political crisis from which they hope 
to benefit. In terms of operationalization, 
using dramatization in populist rhetoric as 
an indicator of crisis rhetoric is an import-
ant step to close the gap in the literature 
(cf. also Bos & Brants, 2014); at the same 
time, more attention could be paid to how 
dramatization (crisis rhetoric) relates to 
other elements of the populist style (e. g. 
emotionalization). From Wirz et al. (2018), 
we can learn that the (right-wing) populist 
rhetoric does have an effect on attitudes of 
media users but only in combination with 
anti-immigrant rhetoric (nativism) of po-
litical actors and only for individuals hold-
ing populist attitudes. 
3 Spotlights on political crises and 
blind spots of research areas
As mentioned, the three papers in this spe-
cial issue are laudable exceptions to the 
rule, i. e. scholarship tends to be reactive 
and does not systematically link political 
crises to established social theories. One 
of the reasons for these shortcomings out-
lined above might be the heterogeneity of 
crisis research. Political crises are stud-
ied in many different research areas, but 
in hardly any area do these crises play a 
prominent role. Even in crisis communi-
cation research, the field that exclusive-
ly deals with crises, “political crises are 
a blind spot” (Auer, 2016). This becomes 
apparent especially in publications that 
claim much authority: encyclopedias and 
handbooks. 
In the International Encyclopedia of 
Communication (Donsbach, 2008), the 
only two entries with the word “crisis” in 
the title refer to more meso-oriented re-
search, focusing on “Crisis Communica-
tion” (Coombs, 2009) and on “Communi-
cation in Organizational Crises” (Sellnow, 
2008). The number of entries mentioning 
crises is relatively high (143), but the num-
ber mainly shows the heterogeneity of 
how the term is used (e. g. in the entry on 
“Disasters and Communication” or on the 
cultural theorist Stuart Hall). This hetero-
geneity is also visible in the Handbook of 
International Crisis Communication Re-
search (Schwarz, Seeger & Auer, 2016a) but 
one clear advancement of that handbook is 
the attempt to offer clear linkages between 
the different approaches in studying crises 
(e. g. Heath & Palenchar, 2016) and inte-
grate a few chapters explicitly dealing with 
political crises (e. g. Auer, 2016) – a point to 
which I will come back later. 
In political communication research, 
crisis is certainly less a core concept. In 
the SAGE Handbook of Political Commu-
nication (Semetko & Scammell, 2014), for 
example, there is not even one subject in-
dex entry for “crisis”; the only article out 
of 41 mentioning “crisis” in the title deals 
with a very specific crisis (Tait, 2014). Fur-
thermore, only one out of 61 articles in the 
Oxford Encyclopedia of Political Commu-
nication (Kenski & Hall Jamieson, 2017) fo-
cuses on crises, i. e. “media responsiveness 
in times of crisis” (Winkler, 2017). Further-
more, the handbook by Reinemann (2014) 
on Political Communication devotes little 
space to political crises and again relates 
crises more to organizational crises than 
to political crises on the macro level. In 
the subject index, “crisis communication” 
is listed with a link to Strömbäck’s entry 
(2014) on “Political public relations”, in-
dicating the main lens how political crises 
are studied despite a few cross-references 
to related issues such as “hypes, waves and 
storms” (Stanyer, 2014) or “political com-
munication in social transformation and 
revolution” (Hertog and Zuercher, 2014). 
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Reviewing the literature more broadly, 
I would suggest there are six areas where 
political crises are studied (cf. Table 2). 
There are, of course, some overlaps be-
tween these areas and my main goal in 
highlighting their specific conception 
of crisis and their weaknesses and blind 
spots is not to overly problematize this 
heterogeneity but to offer possible link-
ages and starting points for further com-
mon ground. When reviewing the research 
areas, I focus on which types of crisis 
come into focus; I also focus on concep-
tual problems and blind spots of these 
research areas, which relate to the social 
level of analysis (e. g. predominant meso 
perspective), the definition and concep-
tualization of crises and the time delimi-
tation (crises as short events or long-term 
processes). Other categories such as na-
tional vs. comparative or cross-cultural 
analyses (Schwarz et al., 2016b) are not the 
scope of this essay.
To begin with, risk communication 
(e. g. Ruhrmann, 2015) as an important 
field focuses on disasters such as epi-
demics (e. g. bird flus) or accidents (e. g. 
in nuclear power plants) and examines, 
among others, the role of political organi-
zations before, during and after disasters. 
Disasters constitute clear risks, as they 
might appear with high probability and 
inflict much damage, possibly threaten-
ing the social order physically in the short 
term (e. g. deaths) and morally also in the 
long term (e. g. erosion of trust). Relating 
disasters to political crises, one could ar-
gue that risk communication takes into 
account insecurity and responsibility-at-
tribution, which are important elements 
of crisis definitions. Of course, insecuri-
ty will be especially high in the immedi-
ate aftermath of an unexpected disaster 
(e. g. earthquake), where political actors 
are expected to bring the situation under 
control. But insecurity might also be high 
already before disasters if people antic-
ipate (more) disasters and if people have 
reasons not to trust political actors with 
managing a crisis. Thus, risk communica-
tion offers crucial insights into the more 
episodic character of the aftermath of di-
sasters (post-crisis phase) and in the more 
process-oriented character of anticipated 
disasters (pre-crisis phase). That being 
said, however, one weakness is the unclear 
relation to political crises. After all, if di-
sasters can be anticipated and risks calcu-
lated, disasters might be more easily con-
trolled once they strike. A government in 
California will expect a likely earthquake 
(and hence prepare for it) but a govern-
ment in France will not expect a certain 
type of political protest such as the «Gilets 
Jaunes». In this sense, disasters become 
routine events with clear expectations, 
thus pointing more at the stability of the 
social order than its erosion in a period of 
crisis.
A more precise understanding of cri-
sis is used in the field of crisis communi-
cation, the only one out of these six fields 
that puts crises at the very center of its 
research. Crisis communication is a com-
municative process where situations that 
are perceived as threatening and disrup-
tive are also being labeled as crises by indi-
vidual and organizational actors (Schwarz, 
2015). Typically, this strand of research is 
connected to public relations research and 
focuses on organizational crises on the 
meso level. Thus, a crisis is a “perception 
of an unpredictable event that threatens 
important expectancies of stakeholders 
and can seriously impact an organization’s 
performance and generative negative out-
comes” (cf. Coombs, 2012). A crisis occurs 
when an organization confuses its inter-
nal view and external views and when it 
neglects the changing issue environment 
(Kepplinger, 2015). This research field of-
fers a number of established indicators to 
measure the reputation of actors in crisis 
(e. g. guilt-attribution frames, negative 
evaluations etc.). Using organizations as 
cases, it can examine more clearly more 
distinct time periods when an organiza-
tion is in a state of crisis and what it does 
to strategically “manage” the crisis – hence 
“issues management” or “reputation ma-
na gement” are defined as allied fields 
(Coombs, 2012). In terms of political cri-
ses, this research includes political orga-
nizations that themselves experience a 
crisis – for instance a political party fol-
lowing a decisive electoral loss – or that 
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play a decisive role in causing a crisis for 
other organizations, for instance NGOs 
scandalizing the use of toxic chemicals in 
clothing production or the government 
executing new and unexpected regulatory 
measures. Similar to the field of risk com-
munication, this field advances the argu-
ment that insecurity (when will a crisis 
strike?) and high damage are constituting 
elements of the crisis definition. Pointing 
at the fact that crises are perceived anom-
alies that break with the status quo even if 
they are expected, this research enhances 
our understanding of the communicative 
construction of crises.
However, it is striking that the main 
lens of the crisis communication field is 
the meso lens where crisis management is 
understood primarily as an organization’s 
constant anticipation of and reaction to 
changing stakeholder expectations in or-
der to avoid crises. This is a clear limita-
tion of the crisis communication field (for 
this cf. Schwarz et al., 2016b) and leads to 
blind spots. First, it is certainly possible 
that crises might not necessarily be an ex-
ogeneous factor and not even a negative 
factor for an organization. Instead, one 
could also argue that crises are actively 
constructed and created by (parts of) an 
organization itself, since a crisis rhetoric 
and the resulting loss of security tends to 
benefit charismatic power-holders (within 
an organization) (cf. Imhof, 2010). Related 
to that, “crisis” can be strategically used 
as a “descriptor of institutional disarray 
because it has utility for those invoking 
it” (Zelizer, 2015). A second blind spot is 
the question why organizations’ environ-
ment changes on the macro level in the 
first place (cf. Eisenegger, 2018). As this 
meso-oriented research area is interest-
ed more in how (concrete) crises can be 
controlled rather than in the actual causes 
of crises and the reasons why crises take 
the form of certain dynamics, (for this, cf. 
Malsch et al, 2014), links to more encom-
passing theories from sociology and polit-
ical science are rather weak.
A more macro-oriented perspective 
on political crises is apparent in research 
which ultimately is based on public sphere 
theories. In this perspective, crisis is used 
as a concept with two different meanings. 
First, broadly defined, a crisis (usually 
singular) occurs when the public sphere 
(or public communication) stops to fulfil 
its function for a democratic society. Sec-
ond, political crises (usually plural) refer 
to “situations (…) in which a government 
or other ruling body finds its command 
and control of the communicative levers 
of power, its authority and legitimacy, its 
very capacity to govern undermined to the 
point where collapse becomes possible or 
likely or where good governance becomes 
difficult to sustain” (McNair, 2016). Schol-
ars point at the increasing occurrence of 
Table 2: Research areas dealing with political crises
Research Areas Type of Crisis and Overall Focus Conceptual Problems
Risk Communication disasters; anticipation and reaction to events focus on expected and calculated risks
Crisis Communication (Public Relations) organizational crisis (meso level) with clear 
time period; strategic action and communica-
tive construction of crisis
few macro theories (e.g. also regarding 
reasons why expectations towards organiza-
tions change)
Structure and Function of the Public Sphere (dys)function of the public sphere (media 
system etc.) (holistic approach)
few dynamics, no clear time period, unclear 
connection between concrete political crises 
and overall crisis of the public sphere
Conflict, War and Protest crises as processes with high threat poten-
tial for society (interdisciplinary approach); 
conflict dynamics
unclear distinction between (manageable) 
conflict and (escalating) crisis, no clear time 
period
Agenda-building (“Media Storms”) media logic; media reactions to external 
events
not primarily (political) crises
Cultural Studies (“Moral Panics”) social order (hegemony), communicative 
construction (narratives)
(in-depth) analysis of single cases instead of 
overall patterns
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concrete crises, which is explained with 
theories from conflict sociology and the 
changes in the media logics that awards 
taboo-breaking, conflict-intensifying po-
litical actors higher media attention. The 
increasing number of political crises (plu-
ral) is then used to illustrate the overall cri-
sis (singular) of the public sphere.
In this holistic approach, much at-
tention is paid to the communicative in-
frastructure of a society. Scholars point at 
the crucial role of the media as a forum for 
public debate, watchdog of power hold-
ers and space offering the integration of 
society, or they examine processes on the 
level of audiences (e. g. selective exposure, 
fragmentation). In this view, scholars go 
beyond examining the “many crises of 
Western journalism” (Nielsen, 2016), thus 
linking an analysis of journalism to an 
analysis of society overall. For instance, Jay 
Blumler (2018) in his recent essay on “The 
Crisis of Public Communication, 1995-
2017” points to the more process-orient-
ed functional crisis definition, saying that 
“an institution may be regarded as in crisis 
when it is no longer able to serve its osten-
sible purpose”. The current crisis diagnosis 
is formulated against the backdrop of rap-
id digitization and social change. Consid-
ering the internet as a disruptive force that 
is accompanied with a “profound discon-
nect” between politics, journalism and or-
dinary citizens, Blumler finds that public 
communication as a whole does not fulfil 
its function to foster citizenship. Similar 
arguments can be found in Kurt Imhof’s 
(2011) “Crisis of the Public Sphere”, whose 
crisis diagnosis is related to the commer-
cialization of the media and the growing 
de- nationalization of political and eco-
nomic spheres that lack according public 
spheres.
This double meaning of crisis men-
tioned above is apparent in Brian McNair’s 
(2016) book on “Communication and Po-
litical Crisis”. The number of political cri-
ses increases because of the increasingly 
volatile information environment (cf. also 
Pörksen, 2018). The overall crisis, in Mc-
Nair’s view, results from the fact that the 
current media change leaves societies in a 
transition phase with uncertain outcome. 
It is unknown whether the inevitable 
transition of “elite control” to a liberating 
“cultural chaos” (where the high number 
of scandals are beneficial for society) will 
succeed, also because tendencies of polar-
ization are at play (autocratic elite actors 
vs. democratic non-established actors). To 
sum up, this holistic approach offers great 
advantages by empirically and normative-
ly assessing the characteristics and impact 
of political crises both on the level of con-
crete events and on the overall system lev-
el. However, questions remain how exactly 
to link these two types of crises. Also, the 
process-oriented crisis definition (crisis of 
the public sphere) needs to be linked more 
to concepts that give justice to the more 
dynamic nature of political crises in or-
der to claim more convincingly when the 
crisis of the public sphere actually begins 
and when it might end; after all, just by 
definition, a peaceful democratic society 
(or a public sphere) with working institu-
tions can hardly be in a permanent state of 
crisis for decades.
The theme of polarization with uncer-
tain outcome is a recurrent feature in the 
research field studying the communica-
tive aspects of political conflicts, includ-
ing wars, revolutions and social protest. 
Typically, this strand of research is broad-
er when it comes to using and borrowing 
theories from sociology and political sci-
ence. For instance, scholars link the oc-
currence of social movements and protest 
actors to “crises” in society such as the 
global economic crisis (e. g. Flesher, 2016; 
Kyriakidou & Olivas Osunas, 2017). Often, 
classic theories from political sociology 
such as (relative) deprivation etc. (for an 
overview cf. Della Porta & Diani, 2006) 
form the background of these explana-
tions. It is also typical, however, for schol-
ars to use insights from conflict sociology 
to show that relative deprivation etc. does 
not constitute the crisis itself, i.e. a nec-
essary cause (crisis) for further processes. 
Conflict theory suggests it is rather the 
rapidly increasing political polarization 
itself which is both an indicator of a polit-
ical crisis and a factor for subsequent cri-
sis (Imhof, 2011). Sociological theories are 
then supplemented with more media-cen-
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tric factors focusing on the interplay of 
communication strategies of protest ac-
tors and the news media. Among others, 
the “protest paradigm” (e. g. Weaver & Sca-
cco, 2013; Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2014) of 
the news media is used to discuss possible 
discrepancies between “real” grievances of 
protest and crises constructed in and by 
the news media (e. g. Kepplinger, 2009). In 
the case of violent conflicts like wars, at-
tention is paid to the shift from stable con-
flicts to escalating conflicts and vice versa 
(e. g. Auer, 2016). In the escalating mode, 
the role of the media changes: to name just 
a few patterns, news media are incentiv-
ized to assume particular issue stances or 
change their selection routines (e. g. dese-
lecting “hostile” sources) (Baden & Tenen-
boim-Weinblatt, 2017). Overall, while this 
strand of research is relatively sensitive to 
conflict dynamics (escalation and de-es-
calation), these dynamics are not often 
enough used as indicators to specify when 
a conflict is actually a crisis or a crisis is 
not more than an intense but ultimately 
stable, “frozen” and manageable conflict. 
An even more dynamic perspective 
is used by scholars focusing on “media 
storms”, hypes or waves. The starting point 
is the fact that media coverage on an is-
sue is usually not continuous but shows 
remarkable peaks. This is in line with the 
definition of crises as extraordinary events 
that trigger extraordinary attention. Re-
search in the tradition of agenda-building 
and intermedia agenda-setting concepts 
stresses how different these two phases 
(the peak or “storm” phase and the non-
storm phase) are for a number of indi-
cators. For instance, media storms start 
with a sudden increase in attention but 
then, once in a storm mode, media cov-
erage becomes less explosive, meaning it 
does not oscillate very much on a day-to-
day basis as media coverage in non-storm 
phases. Also, fewer issue areas become 
subject of media storms (Boydstun, Har-
dy & Walgrave, 2014). Reasons for this are 
also found in the production logics of the 
news media, which points at the herd-like 
behavior of journalism (co-orientation) in 
the context of commercialized media sys-
tems that increasingly and especially fo-
cus on scandals (Stanyer, 2014). The main 
strength of this strand of research is its 
clear empirical focus and clear delimita-
tion of storm periods (on average 15 days, 
cf. Boydstun, Hardy, & Walgrave, 2014) and 
work with clear mid-range theories. How-
ever, the connection to crises remains un-
clear. Sometimes, these storm phases are 
used as an indicator of a crisis itself. De-
scribing the highly volatile (but normal) 
nature of attention dynamics, peak phases 
with “disproportionate” media attention 
are labeled as “crisis”, with phases of “sta-
sis” with low media attention being the 
opposite (Boydstun & Russel, 2016). Look-
ing at further empirical examples given for 
“media storms”, one would probably not 
be surprised to see the media devote much 
attention to these “big-ticket news stories 
of the decade” such as the Clinton/Lew-
insky scandal, 9/11, Enron, and the Terri 
Schiavo debate but one might wonder if 
all of these examples really constitute po-
litical crises (Boydstun, Hardy, & Walgrave, 
2014). Thus, one main challenge of this 
research area is to distinguish ephemeral 
storms and hypes (e. g. scandals) with few 
consequences for politics and society from 
encompassing political crises that affect 
larger parts of society also in the long run.
A clear interest in periods and issues 
with intensified media attention can also 
be seen in research done in the context of 
cultural studies. Most notably, Stuart Hall 
and his colleagues (Hall et al, 1978) consid-
er a “moral panic” an indicator for an over-
all crisis of society. In a holistic approach, 
the authors start with a “real” problem and 
a “real” series of events. In their case study, 
the authors study the social phenomenon 
of “mugging”, which was a form of robbery 
committed by young adults in Great Brit-
ain in the early 1970s. But the main point is 
that the authors focus their analysis both 
on society’s reaction to these events and, 
above all, the contradictions and the un-
derlying ideological currents causing first 
the moral panic about “mugging” and 
then the moral panic about seemingly in-
creasing crime rates. These panics, which 
are accompanied by high media attention, 
are “about other things than crime, per 
se. The society comes to perceive crime 
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in general, and ‘mugging’ in particular, as 
an index of the disintegration of the social 
order (…). So the book is also about a so-
ciety which is slipping into a certain kind 
of crisis. It tries to examine why and how 
the themes of race, crime and youth – con-
densed into the image of ‘mugging’ – come 
to serve as the articulator of the crisis, as 
its ideological conductor (…) for the con-
struction of an authoritarian consensus, a 
conservative backlash” (Hall et al., 1978). 
Methodologically, fine-grained qualitative 
content analyses of news coverage and let-
ters to the editors are qualitatively set in 
relation to crime statistics, legal texts and, 
overall, broader ideological frameworks 
(which reflect and shape class struggles) 
and historical developments of key val-
ues and terms. One of the strengths of this 
holistic approach is its attempt to contex-
tualize concrete patterns of extraordinary 
media reactions (and the reactions of the 
public) with wider social issues. Combin-
ing the use of concrete indicators (moral 
panics) and discourse analyses of under-
lying ideological struggles over cultural 
hegemony, constitute an encompassing 
analysis of contemporary society. In this 
sense, this approach complements more 
empirical research on media hypes and 
storms as it asks why media and society 
in general rapidly construct a “crisis”. An-
other example is the analysis of Colin Hay 
(1996) on the “winter of discontent” as a 
“moment of state crisis” in Great Britain in 
1976/1977, when tabloid media and right-
wing political actors scandalized the wave 
of strikes and managed to narrate a crisis 
that needed to be solved with more drastic 
measures – in Hay’s assessment a “hege-
monic moment of Thatcherism”. Whether 
one would call the openly normative char-
acter of these analyses as overly critical or 
overly interventionist is, of course, open 
to debate. (More recent, less normative 
examples include, among others, the case 
of “fake news” as an “informational moral 
panic”, cf. Carlson, 2018.) It is also open to 
debate to what extent these types of qual-
itative analyses can complement the nu-
merous quantitative analyses in the posi-
tivist tradition. One could certainly agree, 
though, that the tendency of this type of 
research to conduct in-depth, extensive 
case-study analyses leads to blind spots 
because observed patterns might not be 
generalized. Case studies, of course, have 
lots of merits, but mainly if they are con-
ducted at least with an implicit compari-
son in mind. 
4 Political crisis, social change  
and media change
While the overview of the research areas 
deliberately stressed the heterogeneity, 
I now want to emphasize in this chapter 
those (hopefully) fruitful research endeav-
ors that try to relate these research areas 
to each other. An important starting point 
of the more integrative approaches is the 
communicative construction of political 
crises. It does not really matter whether 
we take a more “realistic” perspective or 
a more “constructivist” perspective. In 
the “constructivist” perspective, the logic 
of how this construction takes place and 
what are the driving actors that define 
what “is” a crisis is at the core anyway. In 
the realistic perspective, we would distin-
guish “real” crises and the “real” character 
of events from the “disproportionate” at-
tention to crisis mainly in the news me-
dia. But we would still consider the crucial 
importance (because of its “deviation”) 
of this communicative construction. This 
is probably an assumption that most re-
searchers from these different fields would 
share. In this sense, political crises become 
phenomena that should be studied not 
only as independent variables but also as 
dependent variables.
Taking this one step further and rely-
ing on a phenomenological perspective, 
we could argue that political crises can be 
identified when looking at communica-
tive processes in the mass media. After all, 
public communication and, above all, the 
mass media, is the main place where a so-
ciety can define problems (and crises) and 
observe and integrate itself. In this ongo-
ing struggle in the definition and solution 
of political problems, we can distinguish 
between usual political problems and po-
litical crises. Political crises differ massive-
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ly from the usual communicative repro-
duction of structures with their tendency 
to escalating turbulences. An encompass-
ing theory of how crises differ and when 
and why they occur in public communi-
cation was offered by Imhof (2011, 2016). 
In his crisis theory, Imhof speaks to several 
of the research areas outlined above. His 
approach is a sociological one concerning 
the causes and dynamics of political con-
flicts but also an approach relying heavily 
on the communicative infrastructure of 
the public sphere, the insights from cul-
tural studies regarding “moral panics” as a 
crisis indicator and the insights from cri-
sis communication and conflict sociology 
regarding the sudden loss of reputation of 
organizations and institutions. Some of 
these theoretical elements will be sketched 
out briefly: 
As for the causes of crises, theories of 
social change stipulate that crises occur 
not only because of unexpected events 
(e. g. scandal about corruption in govern-
ment) but also because formerly raised 
expectations cannot be fulfilled. Every 
societal model depends on shared expec-
tations, and it is obvious that these expec-
tations change on a discontinuous basis 
because of slowly developing unintended 
consequences of social action (e. g. traffic 
jams in growing suburbs that were actually 
meant to be an idyllic refuge from crowded 
cities). Unfulfilled expectations go hand in 
hand with growing disenchantment (Im-
hof, 2016). Formerly held expectations are 
shattered, meaning people are disappoint-
ed and lose security. People are then con-
fronted with a world in which they cannot 
be and act the way they once thought they 
would (be) (Siegenthaler, 1993). Given 
these increasing anomic tensions across 
society, the need for a reduction of com-
plexity increases. Here, the use of “crisis” 
as a label in public discourse is instructive, 
as “crisis” allows people to position phe-
nomena as identifiable and finite, which 
can be more easily grasped and controlled; 
“crisis” promises closure (Zelizer, 2015). 
Hence, in these situations, the need for 
clear problem definitions and real prob-
lem solutions increases, which is typically 
mirrored in public communication’s focus 
on very few issues. Usually, in these few 
high-attention issues (which can include 
one or several media storms), established 
political actors suffer from a sinking rep-
utation and a loss of legitimacy while new 
actors (or new ideas) enjoy increasing rep-
utation. On the level of society, this typi-
cally coincides with growing polarization 
until (in the extreme case) two complete-
ly antagonistic conflict camps with two 
competing problem diagnoses and prob-
lem solutions are set for a stand-off. While 
polarization helps to reduce complexity, it 
increases insecurity as it becomes uncer-
tain which of the two competing camps 
will gain the upper hand. A crisis will then 
be solved either with violent means (e. g. 
civil war), where one camp will impose his 
preferred social model, or with compro-
mises between the conflicting camps, new 
institutions (e. g. more political regulators) 
and new ways that public communication 
handles topics (e. g. integrating neglected 
issues).
In this process, media are not only 
mere mirrors reflecting political contes-
tation. Media change has to be analyzed 
carefully, as the media in their own logics 
contribute to escalating or de-escalating 
political crises, with one argument being 
that increasingly commercialized media 
and the increase of social media as “emo-
tional media” tend to give disproportion-
ate attention to polarizing conflicts and 
polarizing actors (who might have a stra-
tegic interest in the crisis mode). Again, 
the interest lies in to what extent the com-
municative infrastructure of a society is a 
factor in explaining political crises.
To identify and explain political cri-
ses, we can look for the following charac-
teristics in public communication (cf. 
Malsch, Florian & Schmitt, 2014; Imhof, 
2016; Hirschman, 1994): 1) conflict-indu-
ced cluster of communication (high media 
attention), 2) statements reflecting un-
fulfilled expectations (anomic tensions) 
and diffuse threat and risk potentials that 
are not really understood (insecurity), 3) 
marked loss of reputation (even if only 
temporary) of relevant individuals, orga-
nizations and institutions, 4) intensified 
and dramatized pressure to act and to 
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decide while the process cannot be con-
trolled, 5) polarization into two conflicting 
camps where routine conflicts of “more or 
less” are transformed into fundamental 
conflicts of “either-or”, 6) anticipation or 
imagination of solutions which oscillate 
between doom and salvation, 7) more vis-
ibility and resonance of new actors or new 
positions in the news media. 
Bearing this in mind, we could start 
examining which of the many problems 
and conflicts that are labeled as “crisis” by 
scholars fulfill these criteria. In his empir-
ical analysis of public communication in 
Switzerland between 1910 and 2012, Im-
hof identified seven main clusters of in-
tensified media attention and fundamen-
tal conflicts within 100 years, hence seven 
periods of crisis (Imhof, 2011, 2016; cf. also 
Udris 2011). These periods were 1) at the 
end of World War I, where a fundamental 
conflict culminated in the “General Strike”, 
2) in the mid-1930s with sharp conflicts 
about the role of Nazi and fascist groups 
in Switzerland and the Swiss democratic 
model, 3) in the mid-1960s when the is-
sue of “Over-Foreignization” through im-
migration of “foreign workers” suddenly 
increased in salience and the perception 
of a “Helvetisches Malaise” was apparent, 
4) in the early 1970s when the separatist 
Jura movement and new right-wing pop-
ulist actors severely challenged the politi-
cal system, 5) around 1990s when several 
scandals about Swiss political institutions 
and the polarizing referendum on Switzer-
land’s (non-)admission to the European 
Economic Area took place, 6) around 2000 
when Switzerland’s economic and political 
elite was delegitimized because of its role 
in the “grounding” of Switzerland’s nation-
al, prestigious airline, 7) insecurity result-
ing from the financial crisis in 2007 and 
turmoil in Switzerland’s financial sector.
While one might want to opt for less 
strict criteria to include more cases for 
comparative reasons, this overall histor-
ical analysis and its focus on relatively 
few crises helps us become aware when 
we deal with really extraordinary crisis 
situations or with the more or less usual 
mode of mediated conflicts. Against this 
background, the high number of scholars 
currently working on the “refugee crisis” 
might check to what extent this issue con-
stitutes a crisis or not. There are reasons 
to consider this refugee question a crisis: 
Vowe (2016) claims that “no other topic 
has occupied us [i. e. the Germans] as mi-
gration – migration has challenged us, it 
has partially overwhelmed us. This is why 
one can speak of a migration crisis” (em-
phasis in the original). Still, more research 
is needed to see whether all the criteria 
listed above are fulfilled. In this context, 
scholarship would benefit from more 
comparative approaches. Thus, recent 
“crisis” phases should be compared with 
earlier phases of high-media attention of 
which some turned out to be crises and 
some did not (because other criteria were 
not fulfilled), ideally using similar issues in 
earlier phases. The current “refugee crisis”, 
for example, should be compared with the 
period with sudden increase in German 
refugees coming from former German ter-
ritory right after World War II or with the 
highly salient debate about asylum seekers 
in the early 1990s, which triggered a series 
of violent attacks against foreigners and in 
turn stimulated further media attention 
(Koopmans, 2004).
At the same time, this theoretical ap-
proach can lead us to discover the impor-
tance of issues usually not considered as 
“crises”: when analyzing media coverage 
in the United States in the interwar years, 
it became apparent that Prohibition (the 
ban on alcohol) was definitely not a hu-
man interest or amusing issue for contem-
poraries but in fact the decisive issue of the 
1920s and early 1930s which transformed 
from a routine conflict in the early and 
mid-1920s into a fundamental conflict in 
the late 1920s and led to a high polariza-
tion, rapidly erosion of trust in political 
elites and social trust in general (high in-
crease of violence), new emerging actors, 
and a complete re-alignment of the two 
political parties based on the Prohibition 
issue – all this preceding the economic de-
pression (Welskopp, 2010; Udris, 2012). As 
regards the communicative infrastructure, 
US-American media in the 1920s were in 
a period of transformation where different 
logics collided: newspapers embracing the 
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newly emerging ideal of objectivity (e. g. 
New York Times), partisan newspapers 
owned by business moguls with political 
ambitions (e. g. William Randolph Hearst, 
who changed his view on Prohibition 
unexpectedly in 1929 and then used his 
newspapers to lead an anti-Prohibition 
campaign), newspapers following clear-
ly commercial rationales (e. g. tabloids in 
New York), and radio as a new medium for 
conveying political messages. Again, in or-
der to make sense of the current so-called 
“crisis” of (Western) democracy in the age 
of Trump, social media and disinforma-
tion, examining earlier periods of rapid 
social change and transformations of both 
the political system and the media system 
can be illuminating.
5 Conclusion
In the previous sections, I argued for a 
nuanced understanding of political crises 
which takes into account the peculiar dy-
namics of crises, analyzing when, how and 
why routine conflicts are transformed into 
fundamental conflicts and which role the 
media play in shaping and amplifying the 
crisis. Even though I highlighted the het-
erogeneity of the field, I would emphasize 
that especially now is a good time and an 
important time for more integration of the 
fragmented field.
This is a good time for crisis schol-
ars because the current phenomenon of 
(right-wing) populism and its crisis poten-
tial offers even more linkages between the 
research areas. In crisis communication, 
the strategy of populists to use a crisis 
rhetoric has to be emphasized (Wirz et al., 
2019). Populists in their communication 
strategies not only attack the political 
elite and out-groups but they also depict 
the current or future situations as overly 
critical, offering radical solutions to over-
come a crisis they themselves have an in-
terest in (re-)emphasizing (Bos & Brants, 
2014). Thus, not necessarily the media 
but political actors might be amplifiers 
of political crises. Still, the crisis rhetoric 
of populists seems to apply only to cer-
tain issues such as migration or law and 
order. “Risk issues” such as terrorism and 
climate change are increasingly politicized 
by right-wing populist actors. Strikingly, 
however, these actors stress various risk 
issues but emphasize the crisis potential 
for some (terrorism) while de-emphasiz-
ing the crisis potential for others (climate 
change), again highlighting how the crisis 
rhetoric is instrumentalized for strate-
gic purposes. Using public sphere theo-
ries, scholars examine the fragmentation 
of media audiences also as a result from 
political polarization, with supporters of 
(right-wing) political actors constituting 
milieus that use news media differently 
than large parts of the population and that 
do not trust established media and polit-
ical actors (Kösters et al., 2019; Kösters & 
Jandura, 2019). These theories also con-
nect “media populism” resulting from 
the commercialization of the media with 
better chances for populist actors, includ-
ing (purposefully triggered) counter-reac-
tions of political elites, news media and 
(also) satire shows (Lichtenstein & Nitsch, 
2019) against populists. Transferring this 
idea from traditional news media to so-
cial media, public sphere theories point 
at “elective affinities” between social me-
dia and populism because social media 
as “emotional media” are better suited to 
populists’ communication styles (Ernst 
et al., 2017). Not surprisingly, the right-
wing populist AfD dominated the elec-
tion campaign on Facebook in Germany, 
triggering most user reactions, especially 
in emotionally charged fields such as mi-
gration or law and order (Lucht, Udris, & 
Vogler, 2017). All these developments on 
the level of media audiences and on the 
level the communicative infrastructure is 
taken as proof of the alleged crisis of the 
public sphere. Learning from research on 
“media storms” and hypes, we can argue 
that one reason for the current success of 
populists is their ability to trigger some of 
these storms. Just think of the deliberately 
provocative statements by populists that 
lead to strong, negative counter-reactions, 
which sets and keeps the populists’ issue 
on the agenda and helps the populists 
confirm their main narrative that “every-
body” is against them, in some cases set-
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ting off a discursive escalation where a for-
merly stable political situation suddenly 
spirals “out of equilibrium” (for the case of 
Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands in 2002, cf. 
Koopmans & Muis, 2009; for Switzerland 
cf. Udris 2011). Also, one could also ar-
gue that the more public communication 
is shaped by a growing number of media 
storms, the more volatile, more episodic 
and more emotional public debate be-
comes, making also the reputation of or-
ganizations and institutions more volatile. 
One could link this increasing volatility 
also to “moral panics”, either against out-
groups problematized by populists (e. g. 
refugees) or against populists themselves. 
Again, this fits the populists’ communica-
tion logics. Finally, based on theories on 
political conflicts, protest and war, one can 
see elements of a growing fundamental 
conflict between populists and “the elite” 
that is discussed as a looming or immi-
nent crisis of democracy. However, at the 
same time, this literature also reminds us 
that not every highly visible and not every 
highly politicized conflict is a crisis. This 
literature also reminds us that the success 
of populist actors in the long run heavily 
depends on the reactions of elite actors, 
i.e. political actors with their policies and 
their communicative strategies, and on 
internal power dynamics within populist 
movements or populist parties (e. g. Mud-
de, 2007). 
A more integrative perspective would 
basically mean taking note from each oth-
er, acknowledging these different research 
areas and learning from them. More con-
cretely, meso-oriented studies of organiza-
tional crises can be conducted as a more 
explicit contribution to when these or-
ganizational crises lead to societal crises. 
The concept of reputation can be useful 
in empirical analyses as dependent vari-
able – the question being how and why the 
reputation sinks not only in the case of few 
organizations but on the level of sectors 
and organizational types and especially 
regarding powerful organizations and in-
stitutions (Eisenegger, 2018). Holistic case 
studies of a specific societal crisis in turn 
can benefit from more testable and more 
mid-range theories developed in the field 
of crisis communication.
A more integrative perspective would 
also mean going beyond case studies 
and especially conducting diachronic, 
cross-country comparative analysis of sev-
eral cases of societal crisis or at least sev-
eral “crisis events” and “critical junctures”. 
This is a point that the leading experts in 
the field of crisis communication rightful-
ly stress (cf. Schwarz et al., 2016). In com-
munication studies in general, we have 
seen an impressive move towards more 
comparative research (cf. Esser, 2016) but 
empirically, this research applies mainly 
to routine periods or elections, probably 
because these periods can be more eas-
ily controlled by researchers (cf. Hum-
precht & Udris, 2019). “Crisis events” such 
as referenda with far-reaching impact (e. g. 
the Brexit referendum in Great Britain 
in 2016), wars, catastrophes (e. g. nucle-
ar disasters), “moral panics”, big political 
scandals (e. g. revelation of corruption) or 
events with massive protest upheavals are 
studied much less in a comparative per-
spective. Scholars might consider them 
to be too idiosyncratic and too “messy” 
for a meaningful comparison over time 
and across countries. At the same time, 
not studying them also means neglecting 
exactly those events that are especially 
important for the media and society as a 
whole. In this light, cross-country analyses 
of single crises such as the financial crisis 
are an important step in the right direc-
tion as they reveal how political system 
factors and media system factors shape 
the way these crises were dealt with in the 
news media (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015.; 
Picard, 2015) The trend towards more col-
laborative research projects will hopefully 
also lead to more cross-country analy-
ses that also use a diachronic perspective 
and compare cases over time (e. g. for the 
importance of “crisis events” for national 
and European identities cf. KrzyŻanowski 
2009; Tréfás & Lucht 2010).
This is not only a good time for crisis 
scholars but also an important time. Hard-
ly any other phenomenon is as instructive 
for a societal analysis as crises. Studying 
political crises allows us to see how and 
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why the social order starts to erode, which 
strategies are used to re-stabilize the social 
order and how social structural change be-
gins and takes full shape. Crises, like soci-
etal analyses, basically do the same thing: 
they question that society as we know it 
is not self-evident (Malch et al. 2014). In 
addition to this, studying political crises 
is important because every democratic 
society is inextricably linked to a func-
tioning public sphere. Thus, how and why 
the mass media as the main arena in the 
public sphere convey or amplify political 
crises are ultimately normative and highly 
relevant questions that touch the core of 
social analysis.
Finally, an integrated research field 
which takes into account these normative 
questions will tackle one of the main prob-
lems: the field is rather reactive than pro-
active. Researchers start doing a project on 
crises usually after the start of an alleged 
crisis, and they tend to study the very crisis 
that is happening at that moment or that 
has recently happened. Also, in their anal-
ysis scholars usually focus on the reactions 
to a crisis, not the phase leading up to the 
crisis. In general, the field could do more 
to help society detect early warning signs 
of an upcoming crisis ‒ and, of course, con-
textualizing a crisis once it is in full swing 
or pointing out that not every “crisis” cur-
rently discussed in the media is actually a 
real crisis. Some of us might readily want 
to criticize the media for having failed to 
ring the alarm before a crisis or for magni-
fying a crisis once it has started. We should 
probably take even more efforts to make 
sure that research does not show the very 
same patterns as the media. On a broad-
er and sounder theoretical and empirical 
basis, we can probably also be more con-
fident in engaging with the public in dis-
cussing our research. “No one cares what 
we know” – Nielsen’s (2017) provocative 
but apt comment on the lack of engage-
ment and the resulting “irrelevance” of 
political communication research – will 
hopefully serve as an early warning sign 
and a stimulation to us all to do better in 
the future.
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Appendix
Table 3: Top 5 communication events (issues) in Swiss media mentioning crises
Year Communication Event (Issue) Number of Articles
2000 Israel – Palestine: Conflict
Germany: Donations Scandal CDU
Northern Ireland: Conflict
Zimbabwe: Regime Mugabe
Switzerland: Reform of the army
54
43
39
37
37
2001 Switzerland: Swissair grounding
Switzerland: Swissair performance
USA: Terrorism (9/11)
Afghanistan: Global conflict
Macedonia: Conflict
206
113
108
103
101
2002 Argentina: Economic performance
Israel – Palestine: Conflict
Iraq: Global conflict (preparation for war)
Italy: Fiat performance
Switzerland: Economic performance
125
89
82
67
41
2003 Iraq: War
North Korea: Global conflict
Switzerland: Swiss – New airline
Iraq: Post-war order
Switzerland: Economic performance
246
86
85
79
77
2004 Iraq: Post-war order
Sudan: Civil war
Thailand: Tsunami
Switzerland: Gov’t performance
USA: Presidential elections
75
50
49
43
34
2005 Thailand: Tsunami
EU: Integration
Germany: Elections
Switzerland: Flood
Global: Bird flu epidemic
132
46
40
39
30
2006 Libanon – Israel: War
Israel – Palestine: Conflict
Iran: Global conflict (nuclear program)
Global: Bird flu epidemic
France: Protests
144
103
40
39
37
2007 Global: Performance of financial sector
Switzerland: UBS performance
Israel – Palestine: Conflict
USA: Economic performance
USA: Housing sector
199
59
57
51
49
2008 Global: Performance of financial sector
Switzerland: UBS performance
Switzerland: Economic performance
USA: Elections
USA: Economic performance
677
210
152
112
72
2009 Global: Performance of financial sector
Switzerland: Economic performance
Switzerland: UBS performance
Switzerland: Bank secrecy
Switzerland: Economic policy
391
165
118
112
83
2010 EU: Economic performance (debt)
Switzerland: Economic performance
Switzerland – USA: Fiscal conflict
Switzerland: Regulation financial sector
Global: Performance of financial sector
419
136
111
102
100
Continuation of the table on the following page
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Continuation of table 3
Year Communication Event (Issue) Number of Articles
2011 EU: Economic performance (debt)
Switzerland: Economic performance
Japan: Tsunami (Fukushima)
Global: Economic performance
Switzerland: Central Bank policy
718
166
126
95
79
2012 EU: Economic performance (debt)
Syria: War
Switzerland: Economic performance
France: Elections
USA: Elections
635
138
81
71
65
2013 EU: Economic performance (debt)
Syria: War
Italy: Elections
Egypt: Conflict
Switzerland: Economic performance
234
117
57
56
53
2014 Ukraine – Russia: Conflict
EU: Economic performance (debt)
EU: Central Bank policy
Africa: Ebola epidemic
EU: Elections
523
92
61
57
45
2015 EU: Economic performance (debt)
EU: Migration / Refugees
Switzerland: Migration / Refugees
Ukraine – Russia: Conflict
Switzerland: Elections
407
282
94
90
69
2016 EU: Migration / Refugees
USA: Elections
UK – EU: Brexit / Negotiations
EU: Economic performance (debt)
EU: Integration of member states
175
77
68
68
66
2017 EU: Migration / Refugees
Germany: Elections
Spain – Catalunya: Conflict
EU: Economic performance (debt)
North Korea: Global conflict
67
75
60
54
53
